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One of the most dominant ideological trends of the past three centuries in the 
foreign policies of Western powers has been the paradox of intolerance motivated by 
idealism. Such policies have been known by many names, from “good governance” and 
“best political practices” during the nineteenth century to “democracy exportation” and 
“freedom promotion” in recent years. Yet no matter the nomenclature, the underlying 
principle of these policies remains the same: intolerance for modes of political expression 
that deviate from the normative bases of the dominant nation’s system. The historical 
record of course does not provide a clear-cut answer to the question of what a dominant 
nation should tolerate in the social and political systems of its colonial sub-states. In all 
cases of imperial expansion—both formal and informal—there exists the challenge of 
finding the correct balance between aspects of self-rule that should be tolerated and those 
that should not.  
This paper will examine some of these policies and the ideology underpinning 
them, both in the historical context of the British Empire and in their modern-day 
reincarnation as part of American grand strategic policies. First, we will outline the 
background and dominant principles of the Anglo-American imperial mindset, as well as 
their significance to the development of British and American political thought both 
historically and in the modern era. Second, we will consider the impact of intolerance in 
societal organization generally before examining it in the context of imperial control. 
Third, we will briefly discuss the rise of the British Empire and the development of the 
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British imperial mindset in order to understand how the combination of intolerance, 
idealism, and the desire for imperial control motivated the development of the British 
Empire and the British national consciousness. Fourth, we will look to the example of the 
Sepoy Mutiny in India as a case study of the limits of intolerant idealism as a means of 
social control. Following this we will examine the modern American incorporation of the 
doctrine of intolerant idealism into American imperial activities abroad, and the extent to 
which this represents a continuation of the British tradition. Finally the conclusion will 
discuss the modern practice of Western-led international institutions’ encouragement of 
self-abnegation in the establishment of democratic regimes, and the implications this 
practice has for globalization and the future development of the international world order.
  
 
II. THE ANGLO-AMERICAN IMPERIAL MINDSET 
 
To understand how intolerance and idealism have come to shape Anglo-American 
political thought, we must first recognize and understand the discourse of imperialism 
that is a fundamental component of the national ideology of both countries.  To begin, the 
development of the western imperial mindset of the twentieth century stems almost 
entirely from the British experience of the two prior centuries, and therefore any 
assessment of the development of the Anglo-American imperial mindset must begin with 
an acknowledgement of the British understanding of their responsibility to shoulder “the 
white man’s burden,” a reference from the Kipling poem known to all students of empire. 
The poem begins with a call to imperial action: 
Take up the White Man's burden,  
Send forth the best ye breed–  
Go bind your sons to exile  
To serve your captive's need;  
To wait in heavy harness  
On fluttered folk and wild–  
Your new-caught, sullen peoples,  
Half devil and half child1 
 
This poem’s message appears to be an imperial call to arms, presumably intended for 
Kipling’s countrymen, to accept that with the great privilege of bearing the light of 
civilized society in the world comes the specific obligation of sacrificing to bestow this 
                                                
1 Rudyard Kipling, "The White Man's Burden" (1899), in The Complete Verse (London: 
Cathie, 1990), 261, lines 1-8. 
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light upon others. Indeed, at the time of the poem’s publication the concept of the white 
man’s burden quickly became the predominant British catchphrase to explain and justify 
paternalistic British colonial rule. This stanza of the poem suggests the core ideals the 
British emphasized in their articulation of their imperial duty: the Christian ideal of self-
sacrifice for the betterment of others (note that it is unclear whether Kipling implies it to 
be the captives or the sons who will wear the harness), and the paternalistically degrading 
perspective with which they beheld the “new-caught, sullen peoples” of the non-white 
colonies. 
However those who would identify a British audience as the intended target of 
Kipling’s call are mistaken, as the poem was written in 1899 with an entirely different 
audience in mind: the United States. At the time of the poem’s publication, the United 
States was immersed in its own colonial war in the Philippines, and Kipling’s call was 
intended not to spur the British Empire to further expansion, but rather to motivate and 
legitimize the nascent American imperial drive. Most significant is the poem’s 
concluding rhetoric concerning the substantive factors that should (in Kipling’s mind at 
least) motivate America to imperial action:  
Comes now, to search your manhood,  
Through all the thankless years,  
Cold-edged with dear-bought wisdom,  
The judgment of your peers!2 
 
For Kipling, the most important group to be affected by American imperial action would 
not be the American colonists themselves, but rather America’s peers, and in particular 
the British, who had earned a right through the previous century of imperial labor to 
expect American shoulders to share the imperial burden. Here the concept of bringing the 
                                                
2 Kipling, "The White Man's Burden," 262, lines 61-64. 
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stabilizing force of civilization to the underdeveloped is significant for America not in the 
obvious sense that it will benefit their colonies, but rather in the sense that it will further 
enhance American society ipse by bringing it closer in line with the British standard. 
British idealism here is colored by a subtle paternalistic intolerance towards the 
Americans themselves—a belief that America only deserves a position of parity with the 
Britain if it emulates Britain’s global posture, that is to say, by adjusting its goals and 
practices to resemble those of Britain. British imperialism developed during the Victorian 
era as an innate component of the British national identity, and because it was supported 
with justificatory Christian rhetoric as a force for good in the world, it could be 
confidently and publically discussed without the need to justify whether it ought to be a 
part of Great Britain’s grand strategy. Kipling’s organizing principle is that America and 
Britain must share a similar perspective on the role that empire should play in the 
development of the global society, and that the American colonizer should act in 
accordance with the example set forth by his British imperial predecessors.  
This perspective is significant for the purposes of this analysis because it 
addresses the question at the heart of the British and American experiences with 
imperialism: By what means can an imperially motivated nation justify its colonial ends? 
Militarily and politically, British and American imperial mechanisms were in some ways 
markedly distinct. Consider the difference in national opinion concerning empire—the 
British embrace of the term as an essential component of the national identity, contrasted 
with American oscillations between aversion to casting American actions abroad in an 
imperial mold and active attempts to distinguish American imperial exceptionalism from 
what had gone on in previous empires. At their core, however, British and American 
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actions abroad were guided by the same principle, an idea of cultural self-promotion as a 
means of achieving stability and order abroad. 
This motivating principle of empire might best be understood by contemporary 
readers when paired with its modern incarnation: globalization. Political Scientist Deepak 
Lal describes globalization as “a cyclical phenomenon of history for millennia, being 
associated with the rise and fall of empires.”3 Globalization today in certain circles is 
synonymous with cultural imperialism, a practice that, its proponents argue, has changed 
little in substance today from the time of the British and earlier empires, to the greater 
benefit of the global order as a whole. As author David Rothkopf writes, “globalization 
has economic roots and political consequences, but it also has brought into focus the 
power of culture in this global environment—the power to bind and to divide in a time 
when the tensions between integration and separation tug at every issue that is relevant to 
international relations.”4 Throughout the historical rise of empires, the need for military 
force as a method of obtaining territory has always been matched with the need for a 
force capable of controlling culture in order for imperial centers to maintain their hold of 
conquered territory and its peoples. Over time, the doctrine of intolerant idealism has 
emerged to serve this purpose, as we shall see in the following sections.
                                                
3 Deepak Lal, In Praise of Empire (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004), iv. 
 







III. INTOLERANCE AS A MOTIVATING POLITICAL PRINCIPLE 
 
 
To understand how idealistic intolerance can shape the dynamics of empire, it is 
necessary to consider how both tolerance and intolerance function within individual 
societies. According to John Locke and Michael Walzer, the concept of tolerance actually 
encompasses two distinct practices. In Locke’s view, tolerance is the endurance of 
undesirable practices, whereas for Walzer, tolerance is respect for the identity of another 
individual or group. Locke argues that in actual human practice only his definition of 
tolerance is ever realistically achievable, and the extent to which such tolerance implies 
permissive allowance of alternate practices or is simply a passive manifestation of 
disapproval varies depending on the societal organization. Each society must also 
distinguish what it considers to be the appropriate limit of tolerance, as in practice, 
limitless tolerance can have destructive and divisive results (such as the “paradox of 
tolerance”5 in which tolerance of the intolerant has the effect of enabling intolerance). 
To further illustrate this concept, let us consider by way of example the practice 
of permitting free speech in all forms, including extremist speech. If complete freedom of 
speech is permitted in an open society, an open forum becomes available to extremists 
who advocate the destruction of the democratic institutions that enable this speech, and 
who would, if successful in achieving this destruction, suppress the speech of others with 
                                                
5 Michael Rosenfeld, “Extremist Speech and the Paradox of Tolerance.” Harvard Law 
Review 100, no. 6 (April 1987): 1467. 
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whom they disagreed. In practice this situation has been anticipated in many western 
societies, and it might surprise those living in the United States, where freedom of speech 
has assumed a mantle of importance akin to that of a birthright, that in “The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights” and in the constitutions and laws of the Western European 
democracies, extremist speech is not afforded legal protection.6 The perceived value of 
tolerance here must be balanced with the need for stability, or as Lee Bollinger writes in 
The Tolerant Society,  “just as there can be no political freedom without constraints, 
particular prescriptions of tolerance create a need for certain instances of intolerance.”7  
While contemporary pluralist democracies tend to value tolerance and condemn 
intolerance, states with imperial aims historically have been more openly cognizant of the 
complex relationship between the two. The example of free speech is significant to 
consider in the context of the British Empire. The concept of limited free speech would 
appear starkly anachronistic from an American perspective today because in modern 
American society, free speech generally functions beneficially to keep listeners open 
minded, but does not threaten the broad societal consensus. Contrast this with societies 
where such a consensus is not in place and where fundamental differences of opinion 
have the potential to upset the delicate balance between competing interests, as was the 
case in a large number of British colonial states. As Bollinger suggests, “Even if one 
concedes that self-restraint is a virtue and that tolerance of extremist speech would 
promote self-restraint, one wonders whether this goal justifies requiring a society to 
                                                
6 Ibid 1458. 
 
7 Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society. (New York: Oxford University Press 1986), 60. 
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tolerate harmful and offensive speech that may open the door to self-destruction.”8 
Extremist dissent, when not properly tempered by a strong majority consensus, promotes 
instability. Empires—uncomfortable with uncertainty and complexity—seek to minimize 
both. This was the precisely the situation faced by the British in many parts of the Empire 
throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century, climaxing in the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857.  
The goal of fostering sustainable colonial stability lies at the base of British 
imperial intolerance. From this perspective it is impossible to consider that British 
intolerance was rooted solely in antipathy, prejudice, or moral reasoning. This pragmatic 
component of imperial intolerance—the value of creating control through uniformity—at 
first blush appears to be an unexpected counterpoint to Locke’s advancement of 
tolerance. Ultimately, however, the two ideas are founded upon the same end goal. Locke 
suggested that peaceful coexistence among individuals must be the stated aim of the 
governing body, and that the “best practice” for ensuring this end is to teach people to 
endure others whose values and practices differed from their own. Yet in the British 
imperial practice, it was not so much tolerance but rather intolerance that for a time was 
the means of fostering social peace. The result of these policies, however, was not 
consistent with the goal, as evidenced in the example of the Sepoy Mutiny. As both 
Walzer and Amy Gutman have observed, in many cases group identity and solidarity are 
strengthened (and as Walzer would say, thickened) in response to external challenges of 
intolerance. Walzer identifies the benefits of a group-martyr complex by stating explicitly 
that “intolerance has . . . group-sustaining effects.”9 Such a view flies directly in the face 
                                                
8 Ibid 67. 
 
9 Michael Walzer, On Toleration. (New Haven: Yale University Press 1997), 33. 
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of John Stuart Mill’s impassioned attack on the corrosive effects of intolerance, and also 
goes well beyond the measured pragmatism of Locke that allows for a certain degree of 










Empires over time have demonstrated a unique capacity for integrating previously 
separated areas into a common economic sphere. As Lal states,  “under their pax, empires 
promoted those gains from trade and specialization later emphasized by Adam Smith, 
leading to Smithian intensive growth.”10 Historically one can trace the economic 
development of human civilization along the lifelines of empires. Greco-Roman empires 
connected areas around the Mediterranean, while the Abbasid Empire of Arabs linked the 
world of the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean. Simultaneously in the east the Mongol 
Empire linked China and Central Asia with the near East, while Indian empires linked 
areas of subcontinent.  
The British Empire stands distinctly apart from these predecessors because it was 
the first global empire—one which established and maintained imperial sway beyond the 
borders of specific regions. The British Empire achieved the first truly global form of 
economic integration, and the branches of the liberal economic order grew out of this 
initial seed. Because this imperial development coincided with the Industrial Revolution, 
lowered transportation costs and wide trading of more cost-effective goods drove a new 
and historically unprecedented age of inter-colonial exchange. Domestically, the impact 
of this economic integration was a new convergence in domestic and foreign markets for 
                                                
10  Ibid 32. 
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consumable goods, and a stratified global economy based on what Lal describes as 
“specialization along lines of comparative advantage and Smithian growth.”11 
The politics of empire emerged in Britain as a direct byproduct of the changes to 
British society fostered by this economic development and the requisite political stability 
and order that such a system required. In order to meet the three Humean goals of a stable 
society (securing life against violence, maintaining the ability of the state to keep its 
promises to its citizens, and stabilizing possessions through rules of property) the British 
had to establish a modern mechanism for controlling a vast and diverse group of multi-
ethnic conglomerates, each with a level of autonomy and individual economic agency far 
greater than that which had existed within any previous empire. Historically, such 
empires were able to maintain peace and promote prosperity because they provided the 
basic protection of property required for economic growth. Domestic disorder and 
disintegration of these enlarged economic spaces resulted from a lack of such protection, 
a pattern consistently repeated in the ages leading up to the British Empire, and a trend of 
which the British themselves were well aware.  
The aim of the British imperial policy was therefore to maintain a level of 
imperial control and harmony that would allow economic growth and development to 
continue unimpeded. To do this the British had to contend with the age-old imperial 
dilemma of balancing material and cosmological beliefs, or questions of morality and 
practicality in directing how the lives of their colonists ought to be conducted. While 
hegemons control only foreign policy, true empires control both foreign and domestic 
policy, and the challenge of the British experience was the critical necessity of 
                                                
11 Lal, 39. 
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conducting policy that fostered stability (and therefore trade). When possible, this was 
done through indirect imperial rule, with princely states ruled through British political 
agents assigned to native rulers (similar to the earlier Roman system). At the same time, 
however, the British were aware of the Hobbsean principle that “covenants without the 
sword, are but words, and of no strength to secure a man at all.”12 Socially, this concept 
was enforced through a policy of social intolerance that favored an advancement of 
“transformative Britishness” to colonial populations.  
To see how intolerant idealism became an important element of the British 
political consciousness during the mid to late nineteenth century, it is necessary to 
understand the impact of domestic unrest during this time. By the start of the Victorian 
era in the 1830s, the Industrial Revolution had brought to the British mainland a 
broadening of the franchise and a host of new tensions and problems. The Reform Bills 
of 1832 and 1867 had greatly expanded the franchise to meet the changing demands of 
the new industrial classes, but given that at this time England was experiencing huge 
population growth, producing hordes of industrial goods that needed markets, and 
fervently seeking outside raw materials to furnish this production, a simple broadening of 
the franchise was largely ineffective at alleviating social unrest and resolving economic 
tensions. At the same time, the rise of new Great Powers abroad was a harbinger to the 
end of nearly a century of relatively unchallenged British global hegemony.  
 Viewed through the lens of this new unstable world and domestic order, the 
Empire emerged as a potential source of strength and stability. The combined threat of 
democratization and the rise of competitive powers forced the British to look outside the 
                                                
12 Hobbes as quoted in Lal, 5. 
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boundaries of their island and to consider the implications of the destabilizing situation at 
home and the presence of these rival powers for the future of British power. During this 
period the Empire emerged as a central component of the ideologies of many who sought 
to combat the effects of these internal and external changes. Discussion of the potential 
role of the Empire in relieving domestic stresses and keeping Great Britain in step with 
other rising powers became a key element of the national discourse. Inherent within this 
discussion was the background concept of intolerant idealism; the reins by which the 
British had directed the course of imperial development in the past, and the means by 
which they hoped to shape and effectively control its future. Intolerant idealism was 
intended as a way to maintain stability within the Empire as a whole amidst the chaos of 
demographic, political and economic change.  
 While a complete history of the rise and development of the British Empire would 
no doubt be useful and informative in this discussion, for the purpose of this analysis it is 
necessary only to give a sketch of the outlines of the empire as the object of the over-
arching policy of intolerant idealism. Forged over a period of three centuries, at its 
maximum extent (between the two world wars) the British Empire spread over thirteen 
million square miles, roughly twenty-three percent of the world’s land surface. The 
United Kingdom itself accounted for 0.2 percent of this total. At its zenith, therefore, the 
British Empire ruled between a fifth and a quarter of humanity.13 Beyond the mere 
acquisition of territory, the hay day of the empire as a source of global authority came 
during the final century of its existence, roughly the period from the 1830s until the 
                                                
13 Niall Ferguson, Colossus: the Rise and Fall of the American Empire. (London: 
Penguin 2005), 58. 
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1930s when the British were able to marshal the empire to successfully advance 
economic globalization. This was accomplished not simply through the export of its 
goods, but rather the export of its people, its capital, and especially its social and political 
institutions. By this time the Empire had served Britain profoundly as a source of 
international prestige, influence, and domestic prosperity, transforming a water-locked 
“island of shopkeepers” into the preeminent global force of its time, and arguably of any 
time to that point.   
In the 1830s the empire also served Britain in an additional domestic capacity as a 
safeguard of democracy at home. During a time when social and demographic changes 
initiated by the Industrial Revolution introduced significant inequities and sources of 
domestic chaos, the Empire emerged as a source of stability. Tory leaders of the 1830s 
considered the empire in this sense as a kind of safety valve that could absorb the waves 
of unrest emanating from London and the urban centers of the British mainland: 
There can be no danger of having too many safety valves. The old states of 
America . . . are fortunate in this respect; the new states and uncleared lands are to 
them as so many waste-weirs, over which . . . all who float loose upon its waters, 
are naturally drawn. Men . . . find here an outlet.14 
 
Interestingly, fifty years later as America began to experience its own growing pains 
stemming from the Industrial Revolution, this same concept of free land as a safety valve 
would be an important part of Frederick Jackson Turner’s Frontier thesis. In “The 
Significance of the Frontier” essay, Turner described the abundance of space as providing 
citizens of over-crowded settled areas with “a gate of escape from the bondage of the 
                                                
14 English Quarterly Review (London, Oct. 1823), 27. 
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past.”15 He saw a causal connection between free land and democracy, arguing that 
“space forbids the enumeration of the problems, economic, social and political—such as 
the democratization of the country—which have grown out of free land.”16 Parallels 
between this conception of the American frontier and the British Empire would also 
become an important part of the British national political discourse by the end of the 
nineteenth century and presented a strong case for the potential of the Empire to function 
as a safety-valve akin to the American frontier.  
 The Empire, then, could be a source of control: control over domestic disorder, 
over international economic markets, and over political uncertainties abroad with 
traditional rivals on the Continent. The incentives for maintaining a strong and 
prosperous empire were great. However, all of this was predicated upon an essential 
assumption: that the British themselves could control their empire. The maintenance of 
stability was unquestionably the highest priority of the Foreign Office and all political 
officials charged with the task of imperial oversight.  There are innumerable examples of 
British efforts to achieve colonial harmony through intolerance of local practices in 
various regions from the Middle East to Africa and many places in between. This paper 
will focus on just one such area during one specific period: India during the 1850s, as an 
example of the force and limitations of the British use of intolerant idealism as a source 
of imperial control.
                                                
15 Frederick Jackson Turner, “The Significance of the Frontier in American History.” 
Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1893. (Washington 
D.C. 1894), 45. 
 
16 Ibid, 52. 
  
 
V. CASE STUDY: INTOLERANT IDEALISM AND THE SEPOY MUTINY 
 
One of the most vivid and illustrative examples of British intolerant idealism at 
work comes from the subtext of the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857. The history of British 
relations in India is shot through with uncertainty and division on both sides concerning 
how to negotiate significant cultural, religious, and numerical imbalances. In British India 
a small, Christian, hierarchically structured Anglo-Saxon minority attempted to govern a 
large, ethnically diverse, religiously distinct and demographically enormous colonial 
majority. Add the fact that they were doing this by proxy, from a distance of more than 
4,000 miles, and the various challenges the British might expect to encounter are 
manifestly apparent. The British mission in India in many ways was the convergence of 
the most dominant threads of Victorian imperial idealism: a source for greater economic 
prosperity through trade, a basis for strategic defense of British imperial interests as well 
as the maintenance of British international political power at large, and an ethnic and 
ideological culture in which to meet “the White Man’s burden” of Christianizing the un-
baptized third world. While tensions from efforts to realize these goals are traceable to 
the earliest days of British colonization in India, the Sepoy Mutiny is an excellent 
example of the impact of these efforts over time. Because British use of intolerance in 
furtherance of these aims is clearly visible in the causes and motivating factors behind the 
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Mutiny, it is an ideal case study for consideration of the impact of intolerant idealism in 
this colonial context.  
The cause most frequently cited as one of the critical motivating factors of the 
mutiny was the British disruption of the old political order in the decades immediately 
prior to the conflict; an act directly motivated by British intolerance of native Indian 
princely rule. As part of his plan for consolidation and expansion of British territory in 
India, Lord Dalhousie, the Governor-General of India from 1848 to 1856, annexed 
territories by means of the “Doctrine of Lapse,” denying ruling princes their traditional 
right to adopt heirs. The course followed by Dalhousie significantly shaped the political 
environment of India at the time and was greatly influenced by the perception of the 
empire at home. According to the historian George D. Bearce, “the imperial mind of mid-
Victorian Britain was growing mature; the British did not want to make an exhibition of 
their imperial growth; thus came a dignified pursuit of imperial power under Dalhousie 
that could reconcile Liberals, Conservatives, and humanitarians to the empire.”17  
At the same time, despite some internal domestic discussion on the potential 
application of self-government in India, these maturing imperial minds had no intention 
of going so far as to promote self-governance or even joint collaborative government that 
involved local Indian rulers. Following years of traditional intolerant imperial policy of 
installing British colonial rulers in India, the previous decade had been one of great 
political, technological, economic and educational reform, following which many 
Manchester Liberals and some Anglo-Indian officials began to reassert the hope for 
Indian self-government that was originally proposed in the 1830s by British military 
                                                
17 George D. Bearce, British Attitudes Towards India 1784-1858 (London 1961) 203. 
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officials in India like Lord Macaulay and General Montstuart Elphinstone. Liberals in 
England such as MP Richard Cobden argued at the time that Indians “were becoming 
increasingly well-qualified for self-government.”18  MP T.C. Anstey summed up even the 
most cautious of liberal views by stating: “the natives were, nevertheless, at the very 
least, quite as fit to manage their own affairs as any other people.”19  
 Yet this supportive viewpoint on the question of self-government ultimately was 
never able to inspire a collective national following because it seemed to represent too far 
a departure from the long-standing British position of intolerance toward self rule of non-
white colonies. Other imperial-minded British officials espoused the later view of Lord 
Curzon and others who saw self-government as the mark of the loss of British control of 
the jewel of the imperial crown. They were not overly anxious to mentor Indians on their 
way to self-government, and during the 1840s and 1850s these officials “altogether 
opposed the idea of associating Indians in the administration of their country and they 
took comfort in the expectation, that, because of diversities in religion and language, 
Indians could never co-operate in dispensing with British rule.”20 Rather than seeking to 
foster and develop sources of unity between British nationals and native Indians, the 
British resorted to a posture of tolerance in its most limited form: tacit endurance of some 
local culture and tradition, but zero tolerance for any native activity that might threaten 
British control. 
                                                
18 Ibid, 231. 
 
19 Anstey as quoted in Bearce, 231. 
 
20 Ibid, 232. 
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The result of this intolerance-driven dissent among so many powerful groups at 
home about the wisdom of training Indians for self-government was that the British 
Parliament saw no urgency in passing any legislation on the matter or in beginning the 
work of political progress. Instead of preparing Indians for self-government, the British 
declined to take even the minimalist step of educating some Indians for the civil service 
whereby a select few Indians might learn British governmental traditions and standards 
and then apply them to the context of the subcontinent. Bearce’s interpretation in 1961 
was that “the maintenance of imperial power thus had triumphed over the Liberal aim of 
encouraging the self-government of peoples.”21 The dominant concept was that Indian 
leadership could not be tolerated even at the regional local level because it threatened the 
British ability to exert direct authority over Indian citizens. The alternate theory, that 
tolerating Indian participation in governance might have served as a bridge between the 
colonial leaders and the colonized, was never recognized in the British grand strategic 
plan, and the actions pursued to counter the “Doctrine of Lapse” clearly illustrate the 
considerable sway that the political doctrine of intolerance had in British colonial policy-
making at the time. 
Intolerance played a dominant role in the mutiny along a second front in the form 
of religion, as decades worth of tension from increased efforts to “take up the white 
man’s burden” in Christianizing Indians was magnified by specific British acts of 
religious intolerance in the months prior to the Mutiny. There had long been a perceived 
onslaught on traditional social and religious customs through the activities of Christian 
missionaries and official government policies such as the abolition of suttee (voluntary 
                                                
21 Ibid, 233. 
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suicide by widows following the death of their husbands) in 1829. Yet the aggressive 
policies pursued by the British in the 1840s and 1850s as part of a greater emphasis on 
social reform stirred up significant religious concerns among many Indians, who viewed 
many policies of the nineteenth-century reform as inextricably linked with Christianity 
and the subversion of native religions. In southern areas of India Muslims and Christian 
missionaries had long been engaged in uneasy contact. Both missionaries and Muslim 
scholars engaged in debates, referred popularly as munazaras (great debates), over the 
superiority of their respective religions. The most important of these was held in Agra in 
April of 1854 and was cited by the historian Avril Ann Powell as a significant cause of 
the uprisings of 1857 in the Agra region.22 
The gangetic core region that had been the focus of the munazara confrontation 
(Delhi, Lucknow and Agra) was also a central area for armed rising in the Mutiny. The 
new laws of the 1850s, which required sepoys to serve abroad, were also deeply offensive 
to traditional religious beliefs. This policy of ignoring and discounting the power deeply-
held traditional native religious beliefs is one of the starkest examples of British 
intolerance motivated by a belief that uniformity and stability could only be achieved by 
promoting a strict adherence to the policies of the secular state: the colonial government.  
Here the central concept of the government’s policies was to use intolerance to 
marginalize and dissipate the influence of religious and cultural traditions that it viewed 
as drains on the loyalty of the local citizenry. The intention of the government once the 
authority of these non-state sources of authority had been invalidated was to replace them 
with British norms, as evidenced in educational policies during this time such as Lord 
                                                
22Avril Ann Powell, Muslims and Missionaries in Pre-Mutiny India. (United Kingdom: 
Curzon Press 1993), 107. 
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Macaulay’s “Minute of Education” and the resulting British control over Indian 
schooling. Indeed, the motivation of Macaulay’s plan was specifically to supplant Indian 
cultural teachings with British academic influences, and he stated his goal as seeing the 
effect a “single shelf of a good European library”23 would have on an uneducated native 
population. Yet rather than sparking cultural homogeneity and enhanced loyalty in the 
Indian population, the policy of degrading Indian cultural practices and supplanting them 
with British educational norms in effect institutionalized racism and eradicated the rough 
balance of power of the eighteenth century between the authority of the colonial state and 
the religious and cultural influences.24   
 There was a small group of British policymakers who recognized the problematic 
implications of pursing a policy whose aim was to discredit the value of traditional Indian 
religious and cultural norms, but their efforts to promote a form of tacit tolerance were 
flatly rejected by the majority in power. Lord Ellenborough delivered a strong warning in 
the House of Lords on June 9, 1857, against “colonels connected with missionary 
operations . . . You will see the most bloody revolution which has at any time occurred in 
India. The English will be expelled.”25 Richard Cobden likewise considered the mutiny to 
be a civil war wherein which the root of evil was the British sense of superiority. 
Following this lead conservatives and anti-imperialists banded together in an attack on 
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the government’s policies in India. They now agreed with Bearce that “the British 
programme for the intellectual, social, and material transformation of India and its 
people—however inadequate its British critics found the programme—was having its 
impact,”26 and this impact was not positive. Conservatives had warned that too much 
change in India, too much propagation of Christianity and interference in the princely 
states, would bring about a sepoy mutiny. In November of 1857 Sir Charles Trevelyan 
wrote the “Indolphilus” letters in the Times in which he stated that pride, over-
confidence, and a lack of consideration for the Indian people had been the central reason 
for the revolt.27  Yet even those in the best position to judge the effects of British re-
acculturation efforts, military officers like Ellenborough who saw the unrest forming 
among native regiments where commanders emphasized Christianity as an essential 
component of the sepoy military experience, were unable to impact the mindset of the 
British main.  
It was thus through intolerance and the rejection of native culture that the British 
sought to gain the full loyalty of the Indian citizenry, or as it has been described more 
generally in modern terms, to win the battle for the “hearts and minds” of those whose 
actions they sought to influence. Culture itself in this context assumes an immense 
power, being nothing less than  “the total patterns of human behavior and its products 
embodied in speech, action, and artifacts and dependant upon man’s capacity for learning 
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and transmitting knowledge to succeeding generations.”28 Additionally, as writer David 
Rothkopf agues, “culture is used by the organizers of society—politicians, theologians, 
academics, and families—to impose and ensure order, the rudiments of which change 
over time as needs dictate.”29 Whosoever controls culture, therefore controls society, for 
just as culture is able to unite members around common practices, so too can it divide and 
barricade individual groups behind walls of distinct beliefs and social norms. For this 
reason, a review of the history of human conflict shows that conflict has most often 
occurred over cultural lines, as culture becomes tied to the root of personal identity, and a 
threat to one’s culture becomes a threat to one’s God, one’s ancestry, and therefore one’s 
core identity.  
The goal at the heart of the policy of imperially motivated intolerance is to 
suppress the divisive and subversive elements of culture that threaten stability, such as 
exclusionary or separatist elements of religious, political or ideological beliefs. On paper, 
this goal to suppress that which is exclusionary or divisive might be seen as reasonable, 
but it encounters two problems in application. The first is that dominant cultures like the 
British in India historically have tended to have trouble distinguishing between cultural 
practices that were socially divisive and those that posed no threat to unity, stability and 
prosperity, such as the celebration of holidays, or traditions involving food, music or 
rituals. By adopting a policy of over-arching cultural intolerance in an attempt to foster 
over-arching cultural homogeneity, British policies had the effect of establishing a kind 
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of zero-sum identity game, in which being a proper British colonist required abandoning 
the core ideals of the Indian identity.  
The second problem typified in the British experience is the inescapable reality 
that by attempting to supplant what were viewed as societally divisive cultural mores and 
ideology with supposedly “unifying” British norms and systems, the actual effect was 
simply to replace one restrictive normative system with another. By making Indian 
culture and the requirements of British colonial systems mutually exclusive, the British 
were in no way creating a system that was less restrictive than the one it was seeking to 
reform. Furthermore, because Indian social and cultural systems had been refined and 
repeated for hundreds of generations within India, they had assumed the form of the core 
Indian identity, an entity which, once attacked, would call forth the fiercest defense. Even 
those who would otherwise be motivated to follow some British normative directives in 
India would become reluctant to do so when it appeared that following British systems 
was a contradiction to what it meant to be Indian.  
Ultimately, it was the Mutiny itself that finally sounded the first nationally 
audible alarm on the viability of continuing to pursue a colonial policy predicated upon 
this belief in British colonial policy’s ability to operate from a perspective of superiority.  
Central to the maintenance of the intolerant idealism that was the backbone of British 
policymaking in India was the misguided belief the British themselves were immune to 
harm at the hands of underdeveloped countries. Indian native culture could be 
marginalized and disrespected, the society could be “reeducated,” and sepoys could be 
commanded to follow orders that contravened religious dictum, all because the British 
were their superior in every category of conceivable significance. British reactions to the 
  26 
events of the Mutiny did much to illustrate not only the development of British 
understanding of what had actually occurred in India leading up to and during the Mutiny 
but also to show how the British perception of the Empire as a whole was fundamentally 
altered by this event. The initial reaction of the public was, predictably, one of shocked 
indignation. Reformers had thought that they were bringing progress to India and 
expected the gratitude of the sepoys instead of news that they had murdered British 
officers, wives and children. At the same time, as the Times reported, “they were 
horrified that a people they believed were barbarous and backward could challenge or 
injure a civilized people.”30 There was an immediate public demand on all sides for 
revenge. In June of 1875 after the first reports of the violence reached England the Times 
declared: “Justice, humanity, the safety of our countrymen, and the honour of our country 
demand that the slaughter of Delhi shall be punished with unsparing severity.”31 The 
Mutiny had clearly been caused by the wickedness of sepoys and the backwardness of the 
Indian people. Bearce stated that, to the British mind, “the revolt was the last stand of the 
Hindu mind gainst Western civilization” and according to the Times the best course to 
follow was to sweep away “every political establishment and every social usage” which 
prevented British power and Western progress from being “universal and complete.”32  
The force of this initial post-Mutiny surge of imperial intolerance eventually gave 
way to a newfound sense of internal questioning, as the British began to consider the 
extent to which their empire had become blind to the civilizing Victorian ideals it was 
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supposedly created to advance. Governing attitudes in Britain gradually shifted away 
from vindictive thirst for revenge and began to consider the culpability of British role in 
the affairs of the Mutiny. Times writer William Russell wrote about savagery of British 
response toward Hindus and Muslims who were all British subjects: 
“The Christianity of a Roman Emperor could not save his empire; . . . so might 
we fall unwept with many crimes, of which our people know nothing, in spite of 
our being Christian . . . Our Christian character in Europe, our Christian zeal in 
Exeter Hall, will not atone for usurpation, and annexation in Hindustan, or for 
violence and fraud in the Upper Provinces of India.”33  
 
Compare this sequence of righteous anger giving way to reconsideration of the 
appropriateness of the military action undertaken in the name of payback to the American 
public’s response to the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The pattern of public responses is 
remarkably similar.  
The decades following the Mutiny marked the final stage of the British Empire, 
known as the “liberal empire period” when the British made efforts to reorganize their 
relationships with colonies along primarily economic lines. Yet this shift ultimately 
became a striking example of the policy of too little too late. While many early and mid-
Victorians had assumed that the spread of industrialization under the auspices of free 
trade would bring about the end to all conflicts around the world,34 the leaders whose 
outlooks were influenced by the closing decades of the nineteenth century would live to 
see that assumption come crashing down in the twentieth following the outbreak of 
World War I. Ravaged by debt and with no motivation to continue to the informal ties 
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upon which the Empire had rested for so long, the constitutional principles of 
representative, responsible government which the colonies had been granted during the 
mid-Victorian years began to run their logical course toward complete independence, 
fulfilling the predictions of all those who had ardently advocated for reform in the 
previous decades.35  
By 1900 nearly all British politicians—Conservatives, Fabians and Liberals—
called themselves imperialists. By the time of the formation of Gladstone’s final ministry 
of 1892, the dominant political trends favored imperialism, not only among the general 
electorate but also among the younger Liberal leaders like Rosebury, Asquith, Haldane 
and Grey.36 These new leaders, like the charismatic Prime Minister Joseph Chamberlain, 
had developed their own perspectives on the Empire amidst the turbulent influences of 
the rise of democracy and the shift of global power, and their political outlooks were 
profoundly influenced by these forces.  
 The largely agrarian, feudal Britain of the early decades of the Victorian era bore 
little resemblance to the industrialized, democratic Britain of the turn of the century. The 
influence of previously powerful social systems like the church and the traditional 
nobility had faded. Only the Empire remained as a visible, tangible tie to the familiar old 
order. As biographer Peter Fraser described, “For Joseph Chamberlain as for so many of 
his generation the cult of duty, self-sacrifice and service to the community, nation or 
empire, became increasingly the antidote for waning religious belief and growing 
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materialism.”37 Imperialism became a means to rally the people toward some larger 
purpose, a way to appeal to nostalgia for the storied past and hope for an equally bright 
future. Calls for imperial unity were, in their essence, based upon a blending of socialism 
and imperialism, the idea that feelings of social discontent and class hatred could be 
assuaged by stressing the importance of social loyalties, bonds, and traditions, combined 
with the idea of service to the community, the Empire and the English-speaking people of 
the world. However the distance forged by decades of policies of intolerance ultimately 
proved too great to bridge. Amidst the internal and external strains of modernization, 
British leaders accommodated themselves to democracy and at the same time struggled to 
determine how Great Britain could retain its place in the world in the face of the 
mounting pressures from growing world powers. Control was the aim, and intolerance of 
anything that appeared to threaten it seemed a prudent policy, to disastrous effect. 
Intolerance alone did not determine the fate of the Empire, but it proved to be a 
significant component of its decline,
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VI. THE AMERICAN FUTURE? 
 
In recent years the idea that the American destiny to further the democratic 
movement in the world begun by the British has returned to the American national 
consciousness, though the concept itself is hardly a new one. As the American historian 
Walter Russell Meade wrote: “Call it empire, hegemony, world order, or globalization, 
the question of global economic integration under British or American auspices and the 
political strategies that advance this great process have been at or near the center of both 
American and British foreign and domestic politics for centuries.”38 Just as the question 
of how to manage this process captivated the attention of British leaders in the nineteenth 
century, so too today do American leaders struggle to deal with many of the same forces 
of change that affected the British Empire.   
Historically there has been ample overlap between the British and American 
experiences with territorial expansion. British statesman and writer Charles Wentworth 
Dilke and American Frederick Jackson Turner both strove to account for the formation of 
a cultural whole (the British Empire in the case of the former, and the American nation-
state in the latter) out of racially diverse citizenry; and both wrote of white colonization 
over new territory in response to perceived crises of empire. Perhaps most importantly, 
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each intertwined the British and U.S. “empires” analytically. Yet direct comparison in 
this manner begs the question as to whether the American experience in westward 
expansion was genuinely comparable to that of imperial development. As historian Paul 
Kramer writes, Turner’s hypothesis explaining American westward development was not 
based on imperial foundations: 
In describing a pattern of innovation in America that flowed not from east to west 
but from west to east and by seemingly substituting a form of geographic for 
racial determinism, Turner sublimated “extirpation” into nation building: the 
settler, disposing of “free land,” conquered by the frontier, was himself not a 
conqueror. In this way, Turner was both drawing on and fueling a powerful 
language of American exceptionalism that would help define the United States as 
not simply free of European influence, but free as well of the taint of empire.39 
 
This American exceptionalism and unwillingness to cast American activities abroad 
within an imperial mold has persisted in some channels of American political discourse 
to the present day, but it is interesting to consider the extent to which American activities 
globally have had much the same effect on the advancement of Anglophone culture as 
earlier British imperial policies. Consider the policy-motivated conception of American 
interest that views a threat to U.S. interests and markets, regional peace, and the 
perceived U.S. ability to lead if foreign leaders adopt models that encourage separatism 
and culturally produced instability. David Rothkopf modernizes the sentiments of Kipling 
when he argues that American efforts to export American culture, modes of governance, 
and ideology are not only necessary, but preferable for enhancement of global stability. 
In his view, the American model is the best for the future, and in failing to act, America 
in effect is relinquishing control of the process to the less-qualified and less-beneficially 
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motivated. Rothkopf points to the existence of a “Pax Americana” during the early years 
of globalization, and argues that American leadership has credibility in a global context 
because it oversaw the establishment of international institutions such as the United 
Nations, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund. Rothkopf concludes that 
it must be America’s objective to win the battle of the world’s information flows, as 
Great Britain did at the height of its imperial prowess. 40 
American enthusiasm for imperialism is most visible in the so-called 
“neoconservative movement” of American foreign policy that assumed national 
prominence during the first and second Bush administrations. What is noteworthy for this 
is analysis is the fact that the rhetoric of supporters of the neoconservative ideology bears 
striking similarities to mid-nineteenth century British rhetoric. The journalist Robert 
Kaplan described empire as “the most benign form of order,” while his contemporary 
Sebastian Mallaby proposed American “neo-imperialism” as the best solution to address 
the “chaos engendered by failed states.” around the world. Indeed, writer Dinesh 
D’Souza even went so far as to proclaim America “the most magnanimous imperial 
power ever.”41 
Writers like these consider the beneficial effects of American democracy 
exportation, and draw comparisons between the British naval campaign against the slave 
trade in the mid-nineteenth century to American attempts to prevent nuclear proliferation. 
Here the call to imperialism can even be heard in voices from the left—those labeled 
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liberal interventionists concerned with the so-called imperialism of human rights—who 
see democratization abroad as the best means of promoting a peaceful and cooperative 
world order, much like their British predecessors concerned with promoting Victorian 
Christian ideals. There are even American writers willing to go so far as to state that the 
American imperial model is superior to the British. Writer Max Boot describes the 
twenty-first-century American imperial incarnation as consisting “not of far-flung 
territorial possessions but of a family of democratic, capitalist nations that eagerly seek 
shelter under Uncle Sam’s umbrella.”42 
Statements of American foreign policy officials and military leaders in the Bush 
administration further show that imperial visions extend beyond journalistic rhetoric. 
Former Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, the most senior Pentagon official associated 
with the “new imperialism” movement, argued beginning as early as 1992 that “the aim 
of U.S. policy should be to convince potential competitors that they need not aspire to a 
greater role or pursue a more aggressive policy to protect their legitimate interests.” And 
in 2000 General Anthony Zinni, commander in chief of U.S. Central Command, said in 
an interview that he was “a modern-day pro-consul, descendant of the warrior-statesman 
who ruled the Roman Empire’s outlying territory, brining order and ideals from a 
legalistic Rome.”43  
The majority of overt American imperialists are neoconservatives, and their views 
have been the most prominent underpinnings of support for American grand strategic 
policies toward Iraq since 2003. As journalist James Kurt wrote, “Today there is only one 
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empire, the global empire of the United States. The U.S. military . . . are the true heirs of 
the legendary civil officials, and not just the dedicated military officers, of the British 
Empire.” Much has been made of the parallels between the British experience in Iraq at 
the beginning of the twentieth century and the American experience at the start of the 
twenty-first. Their goals in entering Iraq, from at least a rhetorical standpoint, appear 
nearly identical. Consider the statement made by British commander Lieutenant General 
Stanley Maude to the people of Bagdad upon the arrival of British troops into the city in 
March, 1917: “Our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors, but as 
liberators.” More than three-quarters of a century later, the American arrival in Bagdad 
was marked by the same promise to the Iraqi people in the words of Lieutenant Colonel 
Tim Collins, who said “We go to liberate, not to conquer.”44 For these advocates of 
democracy exportation as a means of regime change, American grand strategic policy 
abroad is supported at its most basic level by a desire to assume the role of the benign 
hegemon.  
This modern American imperial perspective is maintained through the promotion 
of free-market capitalism, expanding democracy and continued globalization. The writer 
Joshua Muravchik encapsulated the designs of the architects of the Iraq war when he 
argued that  “change toward democratic regimes in Tehran and Baghdad would unleash a 
tsunami across the Islamic world . . . a vast democratic revolution to liberate all the 
peoples of the Middle East.” American belief in the transformative powers of democracy 
promotion as herein described is boundless, perhaps most fully embodied in a statement 
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by a member of the neocon group Project For a New American Century, who stated in 
the organization’s report outlining suggestions on how to rebuild American defenses 
following 9/11: “After Baghdad, Beijing.” 45 
 In no area is the American imperial agenda more positively invoked than by 
neoconservatives and like-minded strategists who see an American embrace of its 
imperial role as the most effective means of combating global terrorism. According to 
Max Boot in “The Case for American Empire,” contrary to those who viewed the 9/11 
attacks as a form of payback for unbridled American imperialism, in reality the terrorist 
attacks were the byproduct of insufficient American involvement abroad. Far from 
seeking isolationism and cautious engagement with foreign nations, Boot states that 
American foreign policy must become more expansive in its goals and assertive in 
carrying them out. He identifies American unwillingness to stay the course in 
Afghanistan in 1989 as the actual proximate cause of 9/11, and cites the successful 
example of “American liberal imperialism” in addressing fundamentalist radical tensions 
in the Balkans as proof that American intervention yields success where isolationism will 
always be doomed to failure. Boot draws direct comparisons between the British and 
American experiences in the Middle East, pointing out that American troops today follow 
the footsteps of generations of British colonial soldiers on campaigns in Afghanistan, 
Sudan, Libya, Egypt, Arabia, Mesopotamia (Iraq), Palestine, Persia, the Northwest 
Frontier (Pakistan). These lands themselves are not new witnesses to the presence of 
imperial authority—indeed the British originally entered the region to quell disorder from 
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the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, which itself had replaced the Mughal empire before 
it. 
Boot’s argument is an articulation of the hopes and convictions of modern 
American strategists who, whether they openly accept the label of “imperialist” or prefer 
to categorize their ideology under a more domestically friendly title like 
“internationalist,” strongly believe that American leadership in shaping the international 
world order must continue, for the benefit of American interests, but also for those of the 
international community. For Boot and others, the presence of a strong, democratically 
liberal regime at the helm of the international system is the only means of achieving 
lasting peace and stability in second- and third-world regimes whose ability to impact the 
international order can no longer be ignored. As Boot states, “Afghanistan and other 
troubled lands today cry out for the sort of enlightened foreign administration once 
provided by self-confident Englishmen in jodhpurs and pith helmets.”46 What was once 
the task of Kipling’s countrymen continues today in sentiments like these as the destiny 
of their American descendents.  
To those who respond to his call by decrying imperialism as “dusty relic of a 
long-gone era,” Boot offers the modern example of colonies—fledgling democratic 
regimes such as East Timor, Cambodia, Kosovo, and Bosnia—what he calls the “wards 
of the international community,”47 the adoption of which was widely supported by leftist 
political groups on the grounds of humanitarian intervention. The historical precedent for 
their “adoption” by the UN lies in the system of mandatory territories sanctioned by the 
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League of Nations in the 1920s, which came about when the colonial possessions of the 
defeated German and Ottoman empires were essentially distributed to Allied powers 
charged with guiding them toward eventual self rule. To those on the left who rebuke any 
calls for international involvement that invoke imperialism, Boot charges that the 
sentiment underlying the League-of-nations-sanctioned colonial system is the same 
rationale underlying the humanitarian interventions of today sanctioned by the U.S., the 
European Union, and the United Nations.  
 The goal, according to Booth and others, is to create a national consciousness, a 
task that can only be achieved through top-down direction from an external source both 
powerful enough to control domestic chaos and instability during difficult transitional 
periods following regime changes, and also secure enough in its own democratic 
principles to foster national consciousness without entirely subsuming the identity of the 
new state. There are countless historical examples of short-term colonial regimes 
achieving long-term successes in democracy building. Ironically enough for those 
Americans who disagree with the appropriateness of assuming an imperial role in 
international relations, the most prominent of these successes in the twentieth century 
have been American, beginning at the turn of the century in Latin American nations such 
as Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Cuba, and the Philippines, and achieving the most 
dazzling successes in rebuilding the political infrastructures of Germany and Japan 
following World War II. American imperialists looking at those successes today see in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and beyond the legacy of Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill’s 
commitment in the Atlantic Charter to devote the collective resources of Great Britain 
and America to the creation of a liberal world order that was based on peace, stability, 
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and national self-determination. To them, calls to turn away from a program of 
progressive, imperially achieved reform in the Middle East, Asia and Africa are a 
repudiation of the core Anglo-American commitment to the advancement of democracy, 
and if America refuses today to shoulder “the White Man’s burden,” those living in 
underdeveloped nations who should benefit from democracy’s guiding hand are being 





 In rejecting the argument of isolationists and others who perceive imperial 
influence as an unnecessary and unwanted force in the modern globalized era, Niall 
Ferguson offers the following assessment of what the international system requires to 
continue to develop along its present lines:  
What is required is a liberal empire—that is to say, one that not only underwrites 
the free international exchange of commodities, labor and capital but also creates 
and upholds the conditions without which markets cannot function—peace and 
order, the rule of law, non-corrupt administration, stable fiscal and monetary 
policies—as well as provides public goods, such as transport infrastructure, 
hospitals and schools, which would not otherwise exist.48 
 
According to Ferguson, it is America, the nation which first viewed itself as “a city on a 
hill” during the age of John Winthrop and would later be described by Thomas Jefferson 
as “the empire of liberty,” that must continue to carry out the British imperial example to 
create the aforementioned conditions for peace and prosperity for the entire international 
order, in which both America and Great Britain are also participants. However we have 
seen that even in pursuit of the presumably laudable goals of Ferguson’s “liberal empire,” 
a nation seeking to alter the political and social structure of another must pursue policies 
that incorporate elements of intolerance and policies of self-abnegation, an act which 
contradicts fundamental American ideas about the nature of democracy. The question 
therefore remains as to whether policies that promote the ultimate aim of tolerance or 
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intolerance are really the best means of achieving global stability. Recent decades have 
seen a number of successful experiments in political multicultural integration. Success of 
institutions such the European Union suggests that workable (even if not perfected) 
models of integration exist. Such aggregate political groups are premised on the idea that 
tolerance is crucial to social well being, and yet each at times has been threatened by both 
intolerance and a heightened emphasis on cultural distinctions. It would seem that in 
order to achieve the most successful and effective results, we must chart a course that 
navigates between the skylla of tolerance for that which divides and threatens global 
unity and the charybdis of intolerance for important sources of individual identity. The 
greater public good ultimately requires eliminating cultural characteristics that promote 
conflict or prevent harmony, but still celebrating and providing for the preservation of 
less divisive, more personally observed cultural distinctions. It is only in the balance of 
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